Tracing the footsteps of Sherlock Holmes: cognitive representations of hypothesis testing.
A well-documented phenomenon in opinion-revision literature is subjects' failure to revise probability estimates for an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive hypotheses in a complementary manner. However, prior research has not addressed the question of whether such behavior simply represents a misunderstanding of mathematical rules, or whether it is a consequence of a cognitive representation of hypotheses that is at odds with the Bayesian notion of a set relationship. Two alternatives to the Bayesian representation, a belief system (Shafer, 1976) and a system of independent hypotheses, were proposed, and three experiments were conducted to examine cognitive representations of hypothesis sets in the testing of multiple competing hypotheses. Subjects were given brief murder mysteries to solve and allowed to request various types of information about the suspects; after having received each new piece of information, subjects rated each suspect's probability of being the murderer. Presence and timing of suspect eliminations were varied in the first two experiments; the final experiment involved the varying of percentages of clues that referred to more than one suspect (for example, all of the female suspects). The noncomplementarity of opinion revisions remained a strong phenomenon in all conditions. Information-search data refuted the idea that subjects represented hypotheses as a Bayesian set; further study of the independent hypotheses theory and Shaferian belief functions as descriptive models is encouraged.